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Abstract 
The 2003 CAP reform considerably affects cropping patterns in European agriculture. At 
the same time the imperatives of the forthcoming Water Framework Directive (WFD) is 
expected to modify irrigation decisions especially in Southern Europe where irrigated 
agriculture utilizes about 70-80% of total water. This paper examines the combined effect 
of CAP reform and the application of likely volumetric water pricing on water demand by 
taking into account three drivers of change, namely extensive margin changes, intensive 
margin changes and irrigation technology shift. For low rates of water prices, CAP reform 
contradicts the WFD objectives since it leads to cropping patterns that consume more 
water resources. On the contrary, as water prices increase, decoupling and water pricing 
display a synergistic effect on water conservation. Finally, decoupling substantially 
increases the efficiency of water pricing in terms of water conservation.  As a result, the 
post CAP reform regime clearly dominates the prior CAP reform regime when an index 
of value for money water conservation is examined.   
  
Keywords: irrigation, bio-economic modeling, mathematical programming, policy 
analysis, price endogenous model, water demand, CAP reform, WFD. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of agriculture on the environment is considerable and complex, comprising 
both positive and negative effects which take place at local, regional, national and global 
levels. A typical example of a negative effect is the pressure that irrigated agriculture 
imposes on water quality and quantity.  
 
Concerning water quality in particular, the EU Member States have come to realise first 
the fact that the costs involved in drinking water treatment for nitrates excess, as well as 
the eutrophication damages, will increase in the near future and second that the 
investments allocated to urban wastewater treatment will be insufficient if a parallel effort 
is not devoted to an effective reduction of agricultural nutrients losses.   
 
Likewise, in terms of water quantity, irrigated agriculture utilizes about 30% of total 
water consumption at the European scale, while this proportion is considerably higher as 
far as Southern Europe is concerned, where agriculture consumes about 70-80% 
(Massarutto, 2003). Consequently, any water conservation policy has to take into 
consideration the extent of water demand from agriculture. 
 
The recent changes in two crucial policy areas related to agriculture, namely the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform and the Water Framework Directive (WFD), present 
opportunities to combine the efforts in order to alleviate the pressures on EU water 
originated by agriculture. First, the latest CAP reform, agreed in June 2003, can play an 
important role in water protection since decoupling may reduce the intensity of input used 
and hence may enhance water conservation. Second, various requirements of the WFD, 
such as the principle of full cost recovery and the resulting water pricing, may alter the 
cropping pattern in an area through a series of extensive and intensive margin changes 
brought about by likely higher water prices. 
 
The paper focuses on the impacts of water pricing on water conservation. Higher water 
prices may have an incentive role towards more efficient water management. At the same 
time the new CAP, through decoupling, may alter the intensity of water use.  
 
This paper aims to empirically examine the range of synergistic possibilities between 
WFD and decoupling. The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes 
water and agricultural policy. Model specification is given in section 3 and the case study 
follows in section 4. The results and discussion are presented in section 5 while 
conclusions finish the paper.  
2. Policy Regimes Changes and their Relation to Agriculture 
2.1 The Water Framework Directive 
The aim of the WFD is to achieve a good quality status for all European waters by 2015. 
The assessment of water quality is based on chemical, biological and hydrological 
criteria. The WFD establishes an integrated approach to water management based on river 
basins, while the "River Basin Management Plan" (RBMP) should be adopted by 2009 
and must be updated every six years.  
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Several provisions in the WFD relate to water pricing. Water pricing should be 
considered as a potentially cost-effective measure (according to Article 11) for the 
implementation of WFD objectives. More specific provisions can also be found in Article 
9 of WFD, where the concepts of incentive pricing, cost recovery and the polluter pays 
principle are addressed. In the River Basin Management Plans, Member States should 
report on the planned steps towards implementing incentive based water pricing policies 
and the recovery of the costs of water services. These costs include the financial, 
environmental and resource costs of water uses and their recovery is planned to be 
accomplished through a water pricing system adopted in each river basin. As a result, the 
water pricing under WFD, in accordance with the polluter pays principle in particular, is 
expected to increase water prices and therefore to provide incentive for a prudent and 
efficient water use. Moreover, such higher water prices are expected to change 
agricultural cropping patterns by altering the composition between irrigated and non-
irrigated products. 
2.2 The Main Features of CAP Reform 
The Fischler reform of 2003 made a significant step forward in the direction of 
decoupling. First, it clearly established the principle of decoupling as a cornerstone of 
CAP reform with payments independent from the commodities actually produced in any 
current year. Second, it enhances environmental responsibility and links financial support 
in compliance with environmental standards (e.g. cross-compliance) and finally, it shifts 
funding from direct aid to rural development (e.g. modulation). Greece applied CAP 
reform by choosing to completely decouple all crop/livestock payments with the 
exception of cotton. A partial decoupling was applied to cotton where a 35% of the 
financial support devoted to cotton prior to CAP reform is still coupled to cotton area. 
 
The new support scheme replaces area payments, and all the other aids granted to each 
farm under the different CAP regimes, with a single farm payment, which is based on the 
amount of CAP direct subsidies received by each farmer in the years 2000-2002. Because 
of their neutrality in terms of market effects, decoupled payments are viewed as the 
appropriate policy mechanism in terms of efficiency in redistributing income to farmers 
(Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). Based on the so far evidence, Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) 
examine how decoupling influence farmers’ decisions. The authors classify the impacts of 
decoupled payments into the following categories: (a) altering the risk faced by farmers, 
either through reducing the level of risk aversion (wealth effects) or through reducing the 
risk they face (insurance effects); (b) affecting the labour allocation decisions of farm 
household; (c) altering land prices and rents; (d) affecting the intensity of input use and 
hence having an environmental effect and (e) influencing entry exit decisions through 
expectations about future payments. 
 
Decoupling is expected to modify cropping patterns in European agriculture but it is 
rather difficult to predict the impact of CAP-reform on land management and land uses 
(Acs et al., 2010; Posthumus and Morris, 2010). The removal of area payments will raise 
the relative gross margins of crops which were not subject to direct payments before the 
2003 Reform (mainly fodder crops), compared with set-aside and arable crops (cereals, 
oilseeds and protein crops), which were eligible for direct payments under Agenda 2000. 
This could result in higher fodder supply, leading to lower prices and potentially 
increasing the supply of livestock (ruminant) products. However, decoupling livestock 
payments will reduce the gross margins of livestock, potentially reducing livestock capital 
and consequently resulting in less demand for fodder. This would in turn cause fodder   5
prices to decline, and could thus shift the supply function of arable crops to the right 
(Balkhausen et al., 2008). As a result, the effect of decoupling on the crop pattern is 
highly specific to the prevailing productive system and hence it is an empirical issue, 
which is examined in this paper in conjunction with the additional changes induced by 
WFD. 
 
2.3 Related Literature 
 
To our best knowledge, the interaction between CAP reform and WFD has not yet 
attracted a particular emphasis in the literature. Goméz-Limón et al. (2002) argue that 
these two policies must be carefully co-ordinated as they may have opposite impacts in 
terms of sector competiveness. CAP reform may enhance while WFD is likely to reduce 
the competiveness of irrigated farming. On the other hand, both of these two policies are 
likely to reduce input intensity and hence to alleviate the pressure of irrigated farming on 
water quality. Heinz (2008) discusses the likely role of co-operative agreements for the 
joint implementation of WFD and CAP reform in order to alleviate possible conflicts 
between the involved agents and to ameliorate the design of cost-effective measures to 
meet the policy requirements. 
 
The issue of achieving a “good quality status” in EU water bodies, as required by WFD, 
has been examined by Fezzi et al. (2008). The authors do not explicitly consider the 
nature of interactions between CAP reform and WFD, but given that decoupling is 
overriding, they examine a number of WFD induced measures to reduce diffuse pollution 
from agriculture in the UK.  
 
Helming and Reinhard (2009) consider the WFD requirements in terms of water quality 
and examine the impacts on Dutch agriculture from reducing the polluting nutrients. 
 
Elements of the possible contradiction between CAP and WFD on irrigated areas have 
been previously examined by Berbel and Goméz-Limón (2000). However, the approach 
adopted in this paper departs from the previous literature in the sense that explicitly tries 
to address the issue of how and why the joint implementation of CAP reform and WFD 
affects the nature of water demand in agriculture. In line with Khanna et al. (2002) the 
paper examines how water demand is affected by the interaction of three drivers: (a) a 
negative extensive margin effect; (b) a negative intensive margin effect and (c) a 
technology switching effect. The implementation of WFD is examined by considering a 
volumetric water pricing. Due to the fact that a full cost account of the water services is 
not available for our case study, a reasonable set of water rates is examined. In addition, 
CAP reform is addressed primarily through the impacts of decoupling on the relative crop 
profitability. The joint implementation of CAP reform and WFD is examined using a 
bottom-up approach where decisions take place at a farm-level in which farmers aim at 
maximising gross margin subject to constraints.  Thus, policy analysis is examined within 
a mathematical programming framework specified in the following section. 
3 Mathematical Programming for Policy Analysis 
Mathematical programming provides a tool to evaluate simultaneous policy interventions 
in a system, such as arable agriculture, taking into account interrelationships such as 
resource and agronomic constraints as well as synergies and competition among 
activities. Optimization models that maximise a welfare measure by selecting planning 
strategies among feasible activity plans have been extensively used in agricultural sector   6
modelling (Hazell and Norton, 1986).  Such models may suggest an efficient allocation of 
productive activities on the basis, inter alia, that farmers are rational, i.e. they maximise 
profits.  When the baseline optimal crop mix coincides with the observed situation , then 
the model is expected to forecast future changes and to reveal the impacts of different 
agricultural policy scenarios on production, resource allocation and farm income, and 
finally to assess policy efficiency.  
3.1 The Structure of the Model 
The regional optimisation model which maximises social surplus, defined as the sum of   
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Notation:        i  indicates the decision unit (producer at the individual farm),  
j  indicates the rain-fed crops, 
 k  indicates the irrigated crops, 
p  indicates the crop prices ( j p  and  k p  prices for rain-fed and irrigated 
crops respectively). 
p s  denotes price subsidy (
p
j s  and  
p
k s  price subsidy for rain-fed and 
irrigated crops respectively). Note that  0
pp
jk ss = =  under CAP reform, 
while  0
pp
jk ss ≠≠  for the old CAP. 
a s  denotes direct payments (or area payments) (
a
j s  and  
a
k s  area payments 
for rain-fed and irrigated crops respectively). Note that  0
aa
jk ss ==  under 
CAP reform, while  0
aa
jk ss ≠ ≠  for the old CAP. 
i vc  stands for the variable costs of the ith producer ( ij vc , ik vc  and  if vc for 
the rain-fed, irrigated and fodder crops respectively).   7
i a  indicates the agricultural land of the ith producer ( ij a , ik a  and  if a  for 
the area under rain-fed, irrigated and fodder crops respectively). 
( ) ki k f w  denotes the yield of the irrigated crops and  is defined as a 
function of  ik w  , that is the amount of water used by producer i for the k  
crop. 
γ  stands for the intercept and  β  for the slope of the inverse demand 
curve for fodder crops. 
i θ  indicates the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) weight attached 
to the ith producer according to its relative representative power of the 
regional farm types. 
The regional optimisation function comprises three components. The first two ones, 
namely the rain-fed and the irrigated crop components, are formulated on the basis that 
output prices are exogenous and hence the corresponding demand for these crops are 
perfectly elastic. On the basis of such an assumption, the policy scenarios examined in the 
paper do not impose any relevant changes to the corresponding consumer surpluses 
associated with these crops.  Hence we can ignore these consumer surpluses from the 
objective function since the prime aim of the paper is to assess the welfare effects, i.e. the 
changes in the social surplus, brought about by policy changes. Consequently, any policy 
driven changes in the social surplus associated with these rain-fed and irrigated crops are 
due to changes in the producer surpluses. Note that the concept of producer surplus 
(primarily a geometric area) and the concept of quasi-rent or gross margin (primarily an 
economic concept) are equivalent (Just et al., 2004). 
Given that one of the main drivers behind water demand changes is the intensive margin 
changes brought about by the examined policy scenarios, we relax the Leontief 
assumption of fixed input use regarding the irrigated crops. To this end, we utilise crop-
water response functions for the main irrigated crops in the region, such as cotton and 
maize.  These functions were estimated by “curve fitting” with  Mathematica®  on a set 
of data drawn from Danalatos (1993). The quadratic function was found to give the best 
fit which can be written as: 
 
2
01 2 () kk k k f wa a w a w =+ −  (2) 
where  012 ,, aaa  are parameters. Quadratic production functions are very often used to 
characterise the response of crop yield to irrigation (see for example, Tsur and Dinar 
(1997) and Goetz et al. (2008). Other functional forms are often suggested in the 
literature, such as the von-Liebig one (1989). It is suffice to say that the choice of the 
appropriate functional form characterising crop response to nutrients and/or water is still 
controversial (Berck and Helfand, 1990; Llewelyn and Featherstone, 1997) and hence 
polynomial forms, such as the estimated ones in this paper, cannot be ruled out (Grimm et 
al., 1987).  
The third component of the objective function belongs to the so-called price endogenous 
models. In contrast with the standard linear programming formulation where input and 
output prices are assumed fixed and exogenous, price endogenous models are used in 
situations where this assumption is flawed or untenable (McCarl and Spreen, 2004).   8
These problems may involve modelling an industry or sector such that the level of output 
or purchases of inputs are expected to influence equilibrium prices. This is the case of 
fodder crops in our case study. The quantity of fodder crops produced, alfalfa in 
particular, affects the equilibrium price primarily due to the high transportation costs 
which restricts its consumption locally or to adjacent regions. As a result, and given the 
limited alternative uses of fodder crops, it is fair to assume that the price (of alfalfa) 
received by producers is determined by the total amount produced in the region.  
 
In terms of modelling, market demand for alfalfa is endogenous and can be expressed as 
an inverse demand: 
  iii i p q γ β = −  (3) 
where  i p  is the product price,  i γ  is the intercept,  i β  is the slope of the demand curve 
whereas  i q  stands for the quantity demanded. The value of these parameters,  i γ  and  i β  
estimated for the examined region were taken from Rozakis et al. (2008).  For the 
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Then, social surplus comprising consumer and producer surpluses is given by the area 
defined in (4) minus the variable production costs, which in our case can be written as:  
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Presumably, the regional optimisation problem defined in (1) is subject to a number of 
conventional restrictions concerning resource availability and to a number of ad-hoc 
flexibility constraints. Following Petsakos et al. (2009), constraints for arable farms in the 
region are generally defined as: 
1)  Fixed amount of available resources (for example there are no changes in total 
agricultural land, water resources and family labour availability). 
2)  Fixed liquidity at the farm level.  
3)  Fixed and quasi-fixed capital is given at the farm level.  
4)  Alfalfa is the only non-annual crop in the regional cropping pattern and the 
relative rotational constraint is adjusted accordingly. 
5)  New CAP provision: Cross compliance obligation in order to receive the 
single payment (crop – rotation with legumes in 20% of the eligible land). 
6)  New CAP provision: Actual farm land must be greater than or equal to eligible 
land. 
 
It should be stressed that nonlinear programming models, as the one defined in (1), can 
considerably improve the performance of regional models in terms of adequate 
representation of the baseline situation (Bauer and Kasnakoglou, 1990). A similar 
modelling approach is recently followed by Marques et al. (2005).    9
4. Case Study 
The analysis is based on a sample of 344 farms from the region of Thessaly which were 
included in the FADN database for the year 2002. The area of the sampled farms was 
4483.8 ha. Each of these farms cultivated at least 0.1 hectares of either cotton or sugar 
beet in the same year. Using the FADN weighting factors this sample represents 22,116 
farms in Thessaly, corresponding to 28% of the total number of farms in the region.  
Thessaly is located in the central part of mainland Greece as depicted in Map 1 and 
belongs to the eco-region 6 as classified in terms of the WFD requirements. The main 
river of eco-region 6 is Pinios (216 Km) while the total area of Thessaly is 10,550 Km
2. 
Irrigation water demand accounts for 96% of total water consumption. Total water 
availability is about 3.209 hm
3 and consists of 2.596 hm
3 surface water and 613 hm
3 
groundwater (GCGCM-UNEP, 2004). The Thessaly water basin is currently water 
deficient (NTUA, 2007). The prevailing pricing regime for irrigation water in the region 
is an area based payment, where the farmers’ irrigation fees depend on the size of 
irrigated land and the specific crops grown. The majority of irrigated land, however, is 
serviced by private boreholes and therefore no irrigation fees are imposed. The applied 
irrigation fees, if any, cover only part of the financial costs of water provision and 
obviously deviate from the WFD requirement, the so-called full cost recovery of water 
services. As a result, over-exploitation of groundwater is the major environmental 
problem which may threaten with depletion many aquifers in the region (Mouratiadou 
and Moran, 2007). Consequently, it is the authors’ contention that examining the issue of 
water conservation, as affected by European agricultural and water policies, is quite 
topical. 
INSERT MAP 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Farming in Thessaly involves mainly arable crops such as cotton, tobacco, durum wheat 
and maize, with cotton being the most widely cultivated crop. Table 1 gives the main 
statistics of the major crops cultivated in the area.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The estimates of variable costs per crop and farm mostly rely on the micro-economic data 
published by the Greek FADN combined with survey data. A well known caveat of the 
FADN data is that variable costs are reported at a farm level as total without being 
disaggregated to specific crops. To overcome such a burden a goal programming model 
was adapted using FADN and survey data to allocate total variable costs to specific crops.  
The latter was originally proposed by Guindé et al. (2005) while Rozakis et al. (2008) 
adjusted it for the regional conditions. 
 
Two irrigation technologies were considered in this paper, namely sprinkler gun and drip 
irrigation. The former constitutes the majority of irrigation systems for cotton and maize 
in Thessaly, while the latter is less widespread in the region and is mainly used by cotton 
growers. These two irrigation technologies differ in terms of their efficiency () , e  which is 
defined as the ratio of water quantity drilled () r w  to the water quantity that is actually 
consumed by the crop in the field () k w ,  kr eww = , where  k w  and  r w  are measured in m
3 
per hectare. According to Mateos (2008) the previous definition of irrigation efficiency 
reflects a strong engineering approach which sometimes may be misleading. However,   10
more complicated concepts of irrigation efficiency are not easily tractable and clearly 
beyond the scope of our paper. 
Following Anonymous (2002), the regional efficiency of the drip system is estimated at 
about 80%, while that of the sprinkler system is lower and estimated at about 65%.  It is 
evident that the lower the irrigation efficiency the higher the energy consumption, due to 
longer irrigation time and the higher the water drilled.  In order to assess the likely 
operating costs associated with these irrigation technologies, it was assumed that each 
farm utilizes a typical for the region 30 hp oil pump with a pumping capacity (PC ) of 40 
m
3 of water per hour. The pump operating costs were calculated by the following 
formula, which is used by local authorities in order to estimate proxy costs of farm 
operations when financing farm improvement investment plans(Anonymous, 2002): 
 0.2 ir ir oil OC HP T C = ×× × (6) 
where,  ir OC is the pump operating costs (€), HP is the pump horsepower (in hp),  ir T  is 
the irrigation time (in hours) and  oil C  is the cost of oil (€ per lit). The coefficient 0.2 
(lit/[hp × hours]) refers to farm operations performed with petrol-based equipment, other 
than tractors. Local authorities use similar formulas, with different coefficients in order to 
estimate operating costs of gasoline based equipment, electrical pumps and tractors. 
Given the assumption of a common oil pump for all farms and constant oil prices, the 
only variable in (6) that is determined by the model is the irrigation time,  ir T , which is 
given by  / ir r Tw P C = . Total irrigation cost ( ir TC ) is then the sum of pump operating 
costs,  ir OC , and the water expenses, price of water times the quantity of water drilled: 
  ( ) ir ir w r TC OC p w =+ ×  (7) 
The sprinkler gun was the default irrigation technology, while drip irrigation was 
optional. The adoption of drip irrigation, however, in addition to the irrigation costs 
defined in (7) requires an extra cost element which is the annual equivalent cost of 
installing a drip system installation cost, estimated at 280 €/ha, under the assumption of a 
5% interest rate (Anonymous, 2002).  
 
The validation process revealed that in many cases the model was able to perfectly 
reproduce the observed data. However, in about 30% of the farms optimal crop mix is 
more or less different from the observed one (Rozakis et al., 2008). Despite that, at the 
aggregate level the model matched the observed crop mix almost perfectly. 
5. Results and Discussion 
The model described in section 3 was used to examine the possible interactions between 
decoupling and the likely introduction of water pricing in terms of the WFD. To this end, 
we considered price ranges often mentioned in the literature. In particular, Iglesias and 
Blanco (2008) examine the range [0 – 0.06 €/m
3], Manos et al. (2006) the range [0 – 0.15 
€/m
3], Bartolini et al. (2007) the range [0 – 0.8 €/m
3], while Gómez-Limón et al. (2002) 
the range [0.025 – 0.048 €/m
3]. To evaluate the impact of the various water prices on the 
regional agricultural farm returns as well as the regional water demand we use examine a 
range of water prices varying between zero and 0.2 €/m
3. This price range was considered 
for both policy regimes, namely the CAP prior to the 2003 reform and the post CAP 
reform which introduced decoupling. By doing so, it is possible to trace the likely 
synergies, if any, between CAP reform and water pricing induced by the WFD. Table 2   11
presents the share of irrigated and non-irrigate land under various water pricing scenarios 
prior and post CAP reform. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As it was anticipated, the introduction of water pricing favours the expansion of rain-fed 
crops at the expense of irrigated crops. This is evident looking at (b) and (d) columns in 
Table 2, which show that water pricing both prior and post CAP reform reduces the share 
of irrigated land.  At the same time, nevertheless, decoupling may favour the expansion of 
irrigated crops (see columns (a) and (c) in Table 2) as a result of the changes in the 
resulting gross margins (see Table 1).  This impact of decoupling dominates the nature of 
the extensive margin changes when the water prices fall within the range [0 – 0.06 €]. 
Only when water prices exceed 0.08 € does water pricing reduce the share of irrigated 
land and foster cropping patterns that may be consistent with water conservation 
objectives. On the basis of the last column in Table 2, where the changes in the irrigated 
land induced by decoupling for the range of water prices examined are given, it can be 
argued that impact of CAP reform on water conservation is indeterminate per se and has 
to be assessed in conjunction with water pricing. As for low rates of water prices, in our 
case study this range being from nil to 0.06 €, CAP reform contradicts the WFD 
objectives since it leads to cropping patterns that consume more water resources. On the 
contrary, as water prices increase, decoupling and water pricing display a synergistic 
effect on water conservation. 
 
Now, we turn our attention on the resulting intensive margin changes. Figure 1, shows the 
optimum water used for cotton, the major irrigated crop in the area, prior and post CAP 
reform. The dot line represents the yield response function to various quantities of water 
used. The triangle symbols indicate the optimum water used prior to CAP reform, while 
the cycle symbols indicate the respective optimum water used after CAP reform.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is clear that the intensity of water use is declining since the introduction of the CAP 
reform. According to Figure 1, CAP reform spreads the optimum irrigation levels – for 
the price scenarios examined – to a wider range along the yield response function in 
comparison with the situation prior to CAP reform. In particular, the optimum irrigation 
levels induced by decoupling fall within the range [92.4 – 420.4], while the respective 
range prior to CAP reform is [220.2 – 420.4]. Put in another way, the intensive margin 
changes, brought about by decoupling, reduce on average the water used per unit of land 
and therefore favour water conservation. 
 
The last driver to consider is the irrigation technology shift. Table 3 shows the shares of 
drip irrigated land for the main irrigated crops, namely maize and cotton, as well as the 
share of total drip irrigated land.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The situation depicted in Table 3 shows that in the hypothetical case that CAP reform had 
not been realised water conservation technologies, such as drip irrigation, would have 
been primarily a concern of the cotton growers. In addition, in such a case the percentage   12
of drip irrigated land is declining as water prices increase presumably due to the decline 
of irrigated land forced by water pricing.  
 
The situation is even more complicated under decoupling since now drip irrigation is a 
technology chosen by both maize and cotton farmers but not in a consistent (monotonic) 
way. The adoption of drip irrigation is considerably higher among maize farmers 
compared to cotton producers. However, as water prices increase (>0.16 €) drip irrigation 
ceases to be a viable option for maize but starts to be more attractive for cotton producers. 
A possible explanation for this situation may be the fact that maize and cotton crops 
compete for water with alfalfa, the price of which is not given but is endogenous and 
therefore fluctuates. Then, the resulting competition along with the changes in relative 
gross margins brought about by water pricing and decoupling may not be consistent at 
different water price levels. On the top of that, in the post CAP reform irrigated crops face 
stronger competition from rain-fed crops and the overall impact on irrigation technology 
may be non-linear. The changes at a crop-level water demand may not be consistent with 
the changes at a farm-level water demand (Moore et al., 1994). Consequently, depending 
on the sign and the magnitude of these changes the regional (aggregate) water demand is 
affected analogously. In other words, examining the adoption of irrigation technology 
shift at a regional level may mask the farm-level and crop level adjustments. Clearly, this 
issue deserves further analysis focusing on possible ways of decomposing the regional 
adjustments into farm-level and crop-level adjustments and carefully account for how 
extensive and intensive margin changes shape the technology shifts in a multi-crop 
setting. 
 
However, signs of policy induced changes (by water pricing) in the adoption of water 
saving irrigation technology may be visible in the last column of Table 3, where with the 
exception of zero water price it seems that in the post CAP reform case water pricing 
helps the expansion of the overall drip irrigation, given that the share of drip irrigated 
land increases as water rates rise.  
 
The combined effects of the extensive margin changes, the intensive margin changes and 
the technology shifts induced by water pricing for both prior and post CAP reform are 
given in Figure 2 in which water demand is presented. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the likely conflict between CAP and WFD, since at low water prices 
decoupling increases water demand. When water prices fall within the range of [0 – 0.03 
€] the extensive margin effects in favour of irrigation expansion dominate, leading to 
higher consumption of water which negates the objectives of WFD. Such low rates of 
water prices are currently applied in many parts of Greece (Tasoglou, 2009). Above the 
threshold of 0.03 €/m
3, decoupling (new CAP) and water pricing (WFD) clearly display 
synergies toward water conservation. As water prices rise it becomes apparent that 
decoupling has a positive effect on water conservation as the resulting crop mix brings 
about lower water demand and hence there is a synergy between the two policies.   
Arguably, this is the point that deserves attention since it may have important policy 
implications.  Table 4 restates the same information as Figure 2 but this time the emphasis 
is placed on the issue of water conservation induced by CAP reform and WFD.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE   13
 
Columns (1) & (2) in Table 4 display the impact of water pricing prior and post CAP 
reform, where it is evident that water pricing is more effective under CAP reform in terms 
of water conservation. This observation implies that price induced water conservation is 
more successful when it relies on the extensive margin changes induced by decoupling. 
Such a claim is also obvious by looking at the values of arc (demand) elasticities prior 
and post CAP reform in Table 4. Under CAP reform, water demand is getting elastic at a 
lower water price in comparison with the pre-CAP reform. The latter is a clear indication 
that water pricing, in the post CAP reform case, is more capable to induce water saving 
adjustments.  
 
In addition, the last column in Table 4 depicts the impact on water consumption for every 
water price induced by CAP reform. As it is also shown in Figure 2, low rates of water 
prices lead to an increase of water consumption while the situation is reversed as water 
prices exceed the threshold of 0.03 €/m
3.  
 
The likely introduction of volumetric water pricing substantially reduces regional farm 
returns as Table 5 shows.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to Table 5, the impact of water pricing on regional farm returns is inflated by 
decoupling since total gross margin is reduced more under CAP reform for every water 
price.  In addition, the last column in Table 5 depicts the impact on regional farm returns 
for every water price induced by CAP reform. It is clear that CAP reform reduces total 
gross margin considerably, which on average accounts for a 55% decline in farm returns. 
It should be, however, stressed that although regional agricultural gross margin is lower 
under new CAP, this does not mean that decoupling is reducing agricultural income. 
Under the new CAP additional transfers, in the terms of the Single Farm Payment (SFP), 
have been introduced which compensate farmers for the income loss brought about by 
decoupling.  
 
Finally, the elasticity of a value for money Index ( VMI E ) is estimated for the examined 
range of water prices. Such an index can easily summarise the answer to a rather relevant 
question: “how much water money can save?”. The  VMI E  is defined as: 
  () ( ) VMI i j i j E W GM W W GM GM =Δ Δ + +  (8) 
where  W Δ  denotes the change in water conservation (value) as a result of an increase in 
water prices from  i p  to  j p , while  GM Δ  stands for the resulting change in gross margin 
(money) forgone in order to achieve the above water saving. Equally,  , ij WW refer to 
water consumed at water prices  i p  and  j p ,  while   , ij GM GM  stand for the resulting 
gross margins for the same water prices.  The estimated values of the IVM is given in 
Figure 3. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The interpretation of  VMI E  is straightforward since it is essentially a variant of the 
elasticity concept. Put it simply, the  VMI E  express how much water is conserved by a unit   14
of farm return sacrificed. As, it is shown in Figure 3 the post CAP reform regime is 
clearly more efficient in terms of water conservation compared with the situation prior the 
CAP reform. The points deserve attention. First, the highest difference between pre and 
post CAP reform regimes, in terms of value for money water conservation, is observed at 
water price 0.06 €/m
3 while the lowest one is observed at  water price 0.16 €/m
3.  Second, 
the “efficiency” of water conservation in the post CAP reform regime, as captured by the 
values of  VMI E , displays considerable variation. The latter clearly deserves further 
attention and more detailed analysis since it has profound policy implications. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper examines the joint effects of the changes in two crucial policy areas related to 
agriculture, namely decoupling under new CAP and WFD. Based on the paper’s results it 
can be argued that there are opportunities for combining the efforts of the two policies in 
order to enhance water conservation. The main findings of the paper are twofold. First, 
decoupling may lead to higher water consumption under low water prices since it induces 
the expansion of irrigated crops. Therefore the new CAP conflicts with the WFD. 
 
Second, as water prices increase decoupling favours the non-irrigated crops, leading to 
substantial savings in water consumption. The latter is driven primary by the incentive 
pricing of the WFD, which fosters an increase in water efficiency expressed as gross 
margin per m
3 of water. It was found that combining water prices above 0.03 € /m
3 with 
decoupling has a positive effect on water conservation since the resulting crop mix brings 
about lower water demand and hence there is a synergy between the two policies.   
Arguably, this is the point that deserves attention since it may have important policy 
implications. The reason is that if this policy synergy is to be anticipated then the initially 
raised concerns about the likely negative financial impacts of WFD on agricultural 
income need to be revised.  
 
Finally, the analysis reveals that the post CAP reform regime is clearly more “efficient” 
in terms of value for money water conservation. 
 
A word of caution is finally needed. As argued by Schaible (1997), producer 
responsiveness to water pricing reforms is likely to be region specific. The reason is that 
region specific factors such as water availability, prevailing cropping patterns and the 
institutional setting (water management agreements), all influence water opportunity costs 
and hence affect producer behaviour. In other words, how transferable the results of this 
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Map 1 Thessaly Water Region and Pinios River Basin  
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of representative farms. 




















Cotton 317  2,640.7 3,652.5 17.2%  1,869.5  712.8 
D. Wheat  184  1,036.7  3,452.3  29.2%  398.3  256.9 
Maize 115  343.1 10,746.2  22.7% 1,210.9  659.5 
S. Beet  94  310.2  62,999.2  24.9%  1,119.2  383.3 
Alfalfa 62  145.2  11,186.3  38.7%  517.1  * 








Table 2 The shares of irrigated & rain-fed land under different water prices scenarios prior and 































%  [(c) – (a)] / (a) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
0.00 3,188.8 71.12 1,295.0 28.88 3,309.4 73.66 1,183.4 26.34  3.78 
0.02 2,987.8 67.18 1,459.5 32.82 3,216.6 72.01 1,250.1 27.99  7.66 
0.04 2,757.2 61.84 1,701.4 38.16 2,932.5 65.79 1,525.1 34.21  6.36 
0.06 2,619.6 58.95 1,824.5 41.05 2,623.6 58.16 1,887.4 41.84  0.15 
0.08 2,481.9 56.04 1,947.2 43.96 2,459.5 54.95 2,016.4 45.05  -0.90 
0.10 2,383.3 53.90 2,038.6 46.10 2,320.5 52.02 2,140.7 47.98  -2.64 
0.12 2,293.0 51.94 2,121.4 48.06 2,168.3 48.66 2,287.7 51.34  -5.44 
0.14 2,212.7 50.11 2,202.7 49.89 2,030.0 45.59 2,422.7 54.41  -8.26 
0.16 2,120.8 48.04 2,293.6 51.96 1,818.3 40.90 2,627.0 59.10  -14.26 
0.18 1,999.6 45.29 2,415.3 54.71 1,623.1 36.67 2,803.7 63.33  -18.83 
0.20 1,886.2 42.75 2,525.9 57.25 1,518.4 34.37 2,899.9 65.63  -19.50 
 
 




































Pre-reform CAP  Post-reform CAP 
Maize Cotton Total  Maize  Cotton Total 
0.00  0%  7.17% 5.51% 13.81% 1.23% 1.20% 
0.02  0%  6.22% 4.98% 5.55%  0.73% 0.80% 
0.04  0%  5.16% 4.31% 2.84%  0.20% 0.84% 
0.06  0%  5.05% 4.31% 11.17% 0.23% 0.90% 
0.08  0%  4.96% 4.33% 11.62% 0.86% 0.96% 
0.10  0%  4.48% 4.00% 11.36% 0.91% 1.28% 
0.12  0%  4.41% 3.98% 11.90% 0.95% 2.13% 
0.14  0%  3.98% 3.65% 13.21% 0.92% 2.51% 
0.16  0%  3.53% 3.27% 0.00%  0.96% 2.70% 
0.18  0%  3.57% 3.38% 0.00%  1.01% 3.03% 
0.20  0%  3.20% 3.07% 0.00%  1.39% 3.23% 
 

























































[(2) – (1)] / (1)
(1) (2) 
0.00 17,094.8    20,356.8   19.08% 
0.02 14,460.6  -15.41%  -0.167  15,089.4 -25.88% -0.297  4.35% 
0.04 12,102.0  -29.21%  -0.533  10,776.9 -47.06% -1.000  -10.95% 
0.06 10,666.6  -37.60%  -0.630  7,333.3  -63.98% -1.901  -31.25% 
0.08  9,397.4 -45.03%  -0.886  5,569.5 -72.64% -1.914  -40.73% 
0.10  8,377.8 -50.99%  -1.032  4,771.9 -76.56% -1.388  -43.04% 
0.12  7,581.2 -55.65%  -1.098  4,192.4 -79.41% -1.422  -44.70% 
0.14  6,849.9 -59.93%  -1.318  3,675.9 -81.94% -1.707  -46.34% 
0.16  6,161.4 -63.96%  -1.587  3,083.9 -84.85% -2.627  -49.95% 
0.18  5,264.6 -69.20%  -2.669  2,654.5 -86.96% -2.544  -49.58% 
0.20  4,552.1 -73.37%  -2.758  2,214.8 -89.12% -3.431  -51.35%   21



























(1)  %  (2)  %  [(2) – (1)] / (1) 
0.00 5,553.0   2,817.9   -49.25% 
0.02 4,916.2 -11.47% 2,306.5 -18.15% -53.08% 
0.04 4,393.9 -20.87% 1,946.9 -30.91% -55.69% 
0.06 3,967.1 -28.56% 1,706.5 -39.44% -56.98% 
0.08 3,612.4 -34.95% 1,541.1 -45.31% -57.34% 
0.10 3,317.1 -40.26% 1,416.5 -49.73% -57.30% 
0.12 3,064.6 -44.81% 1,310.9 -53.48% -57.22% 
0.14 2,845.0 -48.77% 1,222.5 -56.62% -57.03% 
0.16 2,655.2 -52.18% 1,146.8 -59.30% -56.81% 
0.18 2,493.8 -55.09% 1,080.4 -61.66% -56.68% 
0.20 2,357.5 -57.55% 1,025.8 -63.60% -56.48% 